Flock says 28 employees can access federally protected criminal justice information. Their own paperwork says otherwise.
by H.C. van Pelt10 min read
As of December 2025, these were the 28 people who have access to Flock’s data, according to Flock
and Story County, Iowa. The last names have been shortened, in case the signatures weren’t strictly
voluntary, but they are a matter of public record.
You can request the full, current list from any agency using Flock—federal policy requires them to
have it available; the company’s concern about speculative “officer safety”
scenarios apparently does not extend to its own employees, whose names and signatures are being
filed into public records as a matter of course — hopefully with their knowledge and consent.
Aaron P.
Adam S.
(illegible)
Adrian W.
Aishwarya P.
Alana J.
Aleyandra L.
Alex M.
Alexandra B.
Amanda B.
Amy P.
Anthony E.
(illegible)
Arash S.
Baasit A.
Benjamin K.
(illegible)
Blake M.
(illegible)
Brandon E.
Brett H.
(illegible)
(illegible)
Carrie V.
(illegible)
Chandler E.
Christopher S.
Clinton M.
To be clear, the “illegible” signatures are completely illegible—but apparently still sufficient for
Flock, Story County, Iowa, the Iowa Department of Public Safety, and the FBI.
These 28 Flock employees signed the following statement:
I hereby certify that I am familiar with the contents of (1) the Security Addendum, including
its legal authority and purpose; (2) the NCIC Operating Manual; (3) the CJIS Security Policy; and
(4) Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, and agree to be bound by their provisions.
I recognize that criminal history record information and related data, by its very nature, is
sensitive and has potential for great harm if misused.
I acknowledge that access to criminal history record information and related data is therefore
limited to the purpose(s) for which a government agency has entered into the contract
incorporating this Security Addendum.
I understand that misuse of the system by, among other things: accessing it without authorization;
accessing it by exceeding authorization; accessing it for an improper purpose; using,
disseminating or re-disseminating information received as a result of this contract for a purpose
other than that envisioned by the contract, may subject me to administrative and criminal
penalties.
I understand that accessing the system for an appropriate purpose and then using, disseminating or
re-disseminating the information received for another purpose other than execution of the contract
also constitutes misuse.
I further understand that the occurrence of misuse does not depend upon whether or not I receive
additional compensation for such authorized activity. Such exposure for misuse includes, but is
not limited to, suspension or loss of employment and prosecution for state and federal crimes.
This certification, along with a fingerprint-based background check, is a requirement under the
CJIS Security Policy:
This section’s security terms and requirements apply to all personnel who have unescorted access
to unencrypted CJI. Regardless of the implementation model – physical data center, virtual cloud
solution, or a hybrid model – unescorted access to unencrypted CJI must be determined by the
agency taking into consideration if those individuals have unescorted logical or physical access
to any information system resulting in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make
use of unencrypted CJI. —CJIS Security Policy, v5.9.5, § 5.12, p. 212.
Note that the policy is explicit about “logical or physical access.”
Iowa DPS puts it in even clearer terms in a guidance document:
All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of
the Security Addendum Certification page, and abide by all aspects of the CJIS Security Addendum —Iowa DPS, Requirements Document FBI CJIS Security Policy Version
5.3",[1] p. 9
There only being 28 employees who would need to certify is … at best, implausible.
Yet, after months of back and forth between Story County and the Iowa Department of Public Safety,
this is the list Flock and the county attorney produced.
Who is Missing
Any Flock employees with access and a first name that starts with D–Z. Unless there aren’t any, but
that seems improbable.
We know that Flock “LPR” cameras contain unencrypted photos and videos. The CJIS Security
Policy is clear that anyone with physical access to CJI should be on the list; that would include
all (subcontractor) installers. The alternative, that the footage stored on the devices is not CJI,
renders it non-confidential and, in most states, a public record.
If Verizon’s employees can configure the system to expose the information, they have access
sufficient to trigger the certification requirement. Flock does not consider this to be a security
incident, implying Verizon personnel have authorized access, yet they do not appear to be on the list.
Notably, Robert Otten, Flock’s “Head of Security, Risk and Compliance” (or similar titles), attested
to each of the 28 signatures but did not certify his own adherence to the CJIS Security Policy. A
suspicious absence, if the list were complete.
What is Missing
Around 6,000 contracts, based on Flock’s reported number of government customers. These
certifications are tied to specific CJIS addenda, which are tied to specific contracts, via “the
contract incorporating this Security Addendum.” Each person on the list needs to read each of
Flock’s contracts and sign the certification that says they understand the “purpose” valid for each
individual contract.
This is clearly unworkable; it is a recognized, and “solved” problem. Some states centralize their
processing for these certifications. In those states, vendor employees can certify with the state
CSA (typically state police or department of public safety), who retains their background check and
information on file to share with other agencies using the same vendor.
In those states, vendor employees file a single certification with the CSA, and simply claim that
they will not use it for a purpose not allowed by any of its employer’s contracts, past, present, or
future, without ever seeing the contract. It’s questionable, but the FBI does not appear to have a
problem with it so far.
But not all states have such a system in place. For those states, each employee needs to sign this
piece of paper for each contract.
The issue is further complicated by Flock’s position that its contractual terms, which it recently
altered, are negotiable and each customer can have a bespoke contract. If
employees need to adhere to the terms of the contract they must, necessarily, read those contracts.
Of course, if Flock were to take the other position — that its terms are not negotiable — its
contracts may qualify as contracts of adhesion, which raises its own set of
problems.
Who is Not Missing
Some easy to find job titles for the folks on the list:
UI/UX Designer & Brand Visionary
User Experience and Service Designer
Policy Manager (former federal prosecutor, hired from the U.S. Attorney’s Office)
Principal Product Manager
Manager, Solutions Engineering
There is no reason a UI/UX designer and/or brand visionary should have access to production data.
This is not only a common-sense security practice, but a requirement for both SOC.2 and ISO27001
certification—both of which Flock claims to possess.
And that’s for ordinary production data; those rules apply to companies that sell caps for your
ballpoint pen or that do made-to-measure T-shirts for your dog. Here, we’re talking about federally
protected criminal justice information.
In any case, apparently it’s more important for a brand visionary to have access to CJI than for the
Head of Security, Risk, and Compliance.[2]
What it Means
There are only two explanations for what this list represents:
Flock has narrowed CJI access to 28 people — in which case several of those people have no
business being on the list, Otten’s absence is inexplicable, and the company’s field technicians,
Upwork contractors, and demo account users are all operating in violation of federal law; or—
Flock certifies everyone and handed over only a subset to make the records request go away.
Both explanations end in the same place.
Every day, Flock cameras record the movements of millions of people who never consented to
surveillance and have no way to verify how their data is handled, needing to rely on Flock’s vague
assurances that it is “CJIS certified.”
The CJIS Security Policy exists because criminal justice information and criminal history record
information is dangerous when mismanaged. Flock’s own paperwork — the paperwork they produced to
prove compliance — is the evidence that they aren’t complying.
And the certification itself? It’s a document that exposes individual signers to federal criminal
prosecution for misuse of CJI.
When Flock runs sales demos on production data — real people, real movements, real criminal justice
information — it’s not Flock’s name on the line. It’s the employee’s. The company that built the
system, sold the system, and decided to use live data for training walks away clean. The designer
who was told to sign something during onboarding risks federal charges.
Twenty-eight names. Some illegible, one conspicuously absent, and no reason to believe the list is
even remotely complete. But every one of them signed on the dotted line — and not one of them is
Flock.
I am not an attorney. This analysis reflects my interpretation of CJISSECPOL, contract language,
and law, and is subject to change. Contracting agencies should consult qualified attorneys regarding
their specific agreements.
CJIS Security Policy 5.3 is no longer in use, but DPS does appear to publish a newer revision
of its requirements document. The substance of the policy is the same between v5.3 and v5.9. ↩︎
To be clear: neither role has any business accessing this data, but if you had to pick
one … ↩︎